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ThITELLECTUALPROPERTY
NEWCOMBE v. ADOLF COORS CO.

157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Newcombe v. Adolf Coors CO., l the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Major League baseball pitcher, retired for over thirty years, had valid publicity
infringement claims against defendants who created an advertisement using a drawing of his stance. 2 According to the court,
a material factual issue existed as to whether the drawing of
the stance in the advertisement conjured up images of the
pitcher, even though the pitcher's face could not be identified
from the drawing, and his name did not appear anywhere in
the advertisement. 3 Thus, the court found a subtle image such
as a stance may constitute like~ess for claims under section
3344(a) ofthe California Civil Code 4 and common law. 5

1. 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of California was argued and submitted on June 3, 1997
before Chief Judge Hug, Circuit Judge Fernandez and Circuit Judge Rymer. The
opinion was filed on September 22,1998. Chief Judge Hug authored the opinion.
2. See id. at 689, 694.
3. See id. at 689, 692.
4. See CAL. CIY. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997), which states, in relevant part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or for soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent ... shall be
liable for any damages sustained by the person injured as a result thereof.
[d. This section complements, rather than replaces or codifies, the common law cause of
action for commercial misappropriation of the right of publicity. See id. at 3344(g).
Section 3344(g) specifically provides that the statutory remedies of the section are
cumulative and in addition to any others provided by law. See id.
5. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at '392-93. Judge Jerome Frank created both the
concept and the label "right of publicity" when he wrote the opinion in the seminal
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II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Donald Newcombe was a Major League Baseball all-star
player. s He pitched for the Brooklyn Dodgers and other teams
from 1949 to 1960. 7
The defendants, Killian's Irish Beer, owned by Coors Brewing Co., published an advertisement in the February 1994
Sports Illustrated "Swimsuit Edition," featuring a drawing of
an old-time baseball game. 8 The drawing focused on a pitcher
in the windup position, with two other players in the background. 9 Newcombe's face was not identifiable in the drawing,
his name did not appear anywhere in the advertisement, the
players' uniforms did not depict an actual team, and the background did not depict an actual stadium. 1o Nevertheless, Newcombe and his friends, family, and former teammates immediately recognized the pitcher featured in the advertisement as
Newcombe. 11
On March 10, 1994, Newcombe filed suit in California state
court, alleging that his identity had been misappropriated in
violation of his California statutory right of publicity and com-

Haelan baseball trading card case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Haelan held that
under New York state law there was a "right of publicity," separate and apart from the
right of privacy. See id. at 868. In Eastwood v. Superior Court, the California Court of
Appeal fleshed out the elements of the common law right of publicity cause of action
taken from Prosser's widely cited treatise on torts. See Eastwood v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)(citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REV. 383, 385 (1960».
6. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1998).
7. See id. Newcombe was one of the first African·American players to play major
league baseball following Jackie Robinson. See id. Newcombe is also the only player in
major league history to have won the Most Valuable Player Award, the Cy Young
Award, and the Rookie of the Year Award. See id. Newcombe's baseball career ended
because of his service in the Army and alcohol abuse. See id. He is a recovering
alcoholic, who has devoted a great deal oftime to speaking about the dangers of alcohol
abuse, including serving as a spokesperson for the National Institute on Drug and
Alcohol Abuse. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689. Currently, Newcombe is the Director
of Community Relations with the Los Angeles Dodgers, where he continues his active
role in speaking against alcohol abuse. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689.
11. See id.
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mon law right of privacy. 12 Newcombe sought to enjoin the advertisement from future publication, and requested
$100,000,000 in damages. 13 Coors denied that the drawing of
the pitcher in the advertisement was a likeness of Newcombe,
but admitted that the drawing was based on a newspaper photograph of Newcombe pitching in the 1949 World Series. 14 The
drawing in the advertisement appeared to be nearly an exact
replica of the newspaper photograph of Newcombe. 15
On April 8, 1994, the district court granted defendants' motion for removal to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 16 The district court then granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of the claims. 17 Newcombe
appealed. 18
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's summary
judgment order after analyzing the requirements of the statutory and common law publicity claims, finding that sufficient
issues of material fact existed. 19

12. See id. Newcombe also alleged that the advertisement was defamatory since it
showed him, a recovering alcoholic, as endorsing beer, and further alleged intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and defamation. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d
at 689, 694.
13. See id. at 689. Newcombe named Coors, Foote Cone & Belding Advertising
(Belding), creator ofthe advertisement, and Time, Inc., publisher of Sports Illustrated,
as defendants. See id.
14. See id. at 690.
15. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 690.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 690. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
order denying Newcombe's motion to remand the case to state court. See id. at 69l.
19. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1998). The
Ninth Circuit also reversed the order of summary judgment in favor of defendants
Coors and Belding on the claim for equitable relief and constructive trust, but affirmed
the judgment of the district court in all other respects. See id. at 696. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment order in favor of defendant Time,
Inc. See id. Time, Inc. was not liable under Newcombe's common law publicity claim
because it did not directly benefit from the use of Newcombe's likeness. See id. Time,
Inc. received only payment for the advertising space, which was unrelated to the
contents of the advertisement. See id. at 693. Also, CAL. CIV. CODE Section 3344(0
(West 1997) expressly exempts from liability "owners of any medium used for
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The first requirement for both the statutory20 and common
law21 claims is use of the plaintiffs "likeness,"22 According to
the Ninth Circuit, the pitcher depicted in the advertisement
had to be readily identifiable as Newcombe to constitute Newcombe's likeness.23 The court found, however, that a pitcher's
stance could be so distinctive as to make it readily identifiable
as a likeness of the particular pitcher, regardless of the visibility of his face or the markings on the uniform.24 Thus, stance
alone may constitute a person's likeness under both the statute
and common law. 25
Based on the record, the Ninth Circuit found that Newcombe was the only pitcher to use the particular stance depicted in the advertisement's drawing.26 Also, Newcombe, and
those who knew him, immediately recognized the pitcher fea-

advertising ... by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is
published or disseminated, unless it is established that such owners or employees had
knowledge of the unauthorized use of the person's ... likeness as prohibited by this
section." 1d. The court held Time, Inc. absolved from liability under Newcombe's
statutory publicity rights infringement claim, as Newcombe "failed to allege that Time,
Inc. knew that Newcombe had not authorized use of his likeness." Newcombe, 157 F.3d
at 694. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment order as to
Newcombe's defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims in favor of all defendants. See id. at 696. The court held that Newcombe failed
to establish the defamation claim, could not pursue claims for negligent creation or
publication, and failed to establish an emotional distress claim. See id. at 695, 696.
20. The California statutory right of publicity claim requires that a plaintiff
establish, "(1) a 'knowing' use; (2) for purposes of advertising, and (3) a direct
connection between the use and the commercial purpose." CAL. CIY. CODE § 3344
(West 1997).
21. The common law cause of action for commercial misappropriation in California
requires that a plaintiff prove: "(I) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Eastwood v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), quoted in Newcombe
v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). The common law right of
publicity test, also known as the "Eastwood Test," is based on Dean Prosser's fourth
category of invasion of privacy. See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
22. "Likeness" is a visual image of a person other than a photograph. Newcombe,
157 F.3d at 692.
23. See id. The Ninth Circuit applied the test of CAL. CIY. CODE section 3344 (b)
(West 1997) for photographs to likenesses, holding that a photograph and a visual
image are sufficiently similar that the statutory test should apply to determining
whether likeness exists, as well. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 692.
24. See id. at 693.
25. See id. at 692.
26. See id.
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tured in the advertisement as Newcombe.27 Accordingly, the
court found that whether the stance in the advertisement's
drawing was Newcombe's likeness presented a genuine issue of
material fact.28
Second, both the statutory and common law claims required
Newcombe to prove that a triable issue of fact existed as to
whether the defendants used his likeness for their commercial
advantage. 29 According to the court, "Newcombe's likeness was
certainly used to Coors' and Belding's commercial advantage as
the drawing which resembled Newcombe was a central figure
in the advertisement and the purpose of the advertisement was
to attract attention.'>30
Finally, Newcombe had to show that he did not consent to
the use of his likeness and that injury resulted because he received no compensation for the use. 31 The court found that here
too, issues of material fact existed. 32 Thus, Newcombe met the
requirements for sustaining both the statutory and common
law misappropriation claims against the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.33 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's summary judgment order. 34

27. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689.
28. See id. at 693. In addition, the court examined other factors helping create a
genuine material issue of fact as to whether the defendants used Newcombe's likeness.
See id. The court discussed the similarities between the person depicted in the
advertisement and Newcombe. See id. For example, both Newcombe and the pitcher
in the drawing have moderately dark skin, and the uniform number in the
advertisement ("39") is only slightly different than Newcombe's number ("36"). See id.
According to the Court, these similarities, viewed together, could arguably conjure up
images of Newcombe. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693.
29. See id. This part of the common law test for the misappropriation claim was
not met as against Time, Inc. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349 ("one of the
primary purposes of advertising is to motivate a decision to purchase a particular
product or service. The first step toward selling a product or service is to attract the
consumers' attention")).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. The statutory right of publicity claim
required Newcombe to show that the use of his "likeness was ... directly connected with
the commercial sponsorship" of the defendants. Id. This was a question of fact. See id.
at 694. The Ninth Circuit, expressly disagreeing with the district court, stated that it
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IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

In Newcombe, the Ninth Circuit broadened the defmition of
"likeness" in right of publicity cases to include a drawing of
stance in an advertisement. 35 By so doing, the court increased
the protection afforded to celebrities and creators through the
"right of publicity."36 Newcombe is one of a series of Ninth Circuit decisions expanding the rights of celebrities to control their
images.

In Motschenbacker u. R J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,37 the plaintiff, a famous race car driver, claimed that a cigarette advertisement using a car identifiable as one usually driven by him,
infringed his publicity rights. 38 There, the defendants televised
a commercial utilizing "a 'stock' color photograph" depicting
plaintiff, whose "facial features [we]re not visible" in the car.39
The car in the photograph displayed a distinctive narrow white
pinstripe and an oval white background for the racing number,
which, had exclusively appeared on plaintiffs cars for about four

would not be unreasonable for a jury to find that there was a direct connection between
Newcombe, as the central feature of the advertisement, and the commercial
sponsorship of the beer. See id.
34. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 696. Also, the court held that Newcombe was
entitled to proceed on his claim for equitable relief and constructive trust against Coors
and Belding because he now had two valid claims against the defendants Coors and
Belding. See id. at 694.
35. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998).
36. The right of publicity serves to prevent the unjust enrichment of commercial
appropriators, to provide an incentive to creators, and to protect the public from
deception. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-76
(1977); accord Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir.
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Essentially, "it makes advertisers pay for the
attention-getting value of human identity." J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995
Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Persona As Commercial Property: The Right
Of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 148 (1995).
See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 135, 178-79 (1993). Madow questions whether
the right of publicity "should exist at all" because "publicity rights exact a higher cost
in important competing values (notably, free expression and cultural pluralism) than
has generally been appreciated." Id. at 134.
37. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. See id. at 822.
39. Id.
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years when the commercial aired. 40 In Motschenbacker, the
court held that although the "'likeness' of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable," the distinctive decorations appearing on the car create a material issue as to whether the driver is "identifiable as
plaintiff."41 Then, with little discussion, the Ninth Circuit
agreed that California law "afford led] legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity," and reversed
the lower court's summary judgment order in favor of the defendants. 42
The 1997 case of Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. 43 also validated
publicity infringement claimS.44 In Wendt, actors from the television show "Cheers" sued the creator of three dimensional animatronic fIgures (robots), which were placed in airport bars,
modeled upon the Cheers set. 45 The plaintiffs alleged that the
robots were based on the actors' "likenesses."46 Interestingly, the
court stated that ''It]he degree to which these robots resemble,
caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance 00" the plaintiffs was material to determining whether their "likeness" was
appropriated. 47 The Ninth Circuit held that, whether the robots'
"physical characteristics" looked sufficiently like the actors was
a genuine issue of material fact, and reversed the lower court's
summary judgment order in favor of the defendants. 48

Newcombe aflirms the Ninth Circuit's steady course toward
increasing protection of publicity rights. In Newcombe, the
Ninth Circuit extended the term "likeness" to include a depiction
of a pitcher's stance, thereby affording it protection under both

40. See id. Defendants changed plaintiffs number "11" into "71," attached a wing·
like device known as a "spoiler" to plaintiffs car, added the word "Winston," the name of
their product, to that spoiler, and removed other advertisements for other products from
the spoilers of other cars in the televised commercial. See id.
41. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
42. Id. at 825,827.
43. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 809.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 810.
48. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809·10.
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California statutory and common laW. 49 As the meaning of
"likeness" expands to resemble that of "identity," section 3344
will, in effect, protect identity. 50 As Professor Welkowitz states,
understanding the current state of the law is like trying to
"catch smoke or nail JELL-O to a wall. "51 Instead of giving lawyers and their clients guidance, the court has added confusion by
blurring the lines between "identity" and "likeness." As a result
of cases such as Newcombe, understanding the difference between a person's "identity" and "likeness" has become a confusingpuzzle.

Nairi Chakalian *

49. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 692. Arguably, however, a person's stance could not
constitute his "likeness" because it could never actually look like him. However, it may
constitute his "identity," under the law, if it triggers thoughts of the celebrity in the
public's mind. See infra note 51.
50. The depicted stance, arguably, may not constitute Newcombe's likeness
because it does not "resemble, caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance" to
Newcombe. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 81.0. Newcombe's facial features were not
identifiable in the advertisement's drawing and his name did not appear anywhere in
the advertisement. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689, 692. Instead, the depicted stance
was, arguably, part of Newcombe's "identity," because it "evoke[dl the celebrity's image
in the public's mind." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.
1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc) (citing White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398·99 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending California's
common law right of publicity to protect a celebrity's right to exploit the value of her
identity».
Section 3344 protects "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" from
unauthorized commercial appropriation, but not a person's "identity." See CAL. CIY.
CODE § 3344 (West 1997), supra note 4. If the court had held the depicted stance an
aspect of Newcombe's "identity," rather than his "likeness," Newcombe would have lost
his statutory claim. See id.
51. See David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell·O To A Wall: The
Vanna White Case And The Limits Of Celebrity Rights. 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 101
(1995).
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000.
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